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Persuading the independent: Understanding why interest groups engage 
with EU agencies 
Abstract  
What motivates interest groups to engage with European Union (EU) agencies? 
Authors have recently looked into the interaction between interest groups and 
these European regulators. This article sets out to discover new explanations for 
interest group behaviour and to add mechanisms to established explanatory 
factors by looking at this novel context for interest group literature. It employs 
an in-depth qualitative study using interviews with high level interest group 
representatives that interact with the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). 
A novel finding is that interest groups, specifically business actors, are 
motivated by preventing reputational threats to the agency. This article therefore 
extends insights from bureaucratic reputation literature to interest group 
scholarship. Furthermore, interest groups are motivated by factors found in 
interest group literature such as influence on regulatory policy, gaining access to 
venues and appeasing their members. This article aids future research efforts in 
unravelling why interest groups engage with (EU) regulatory agencies. 
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Whereas researching interest group efforts towards regulators has a rich tradition in 
US interest group literature (Chubb, 1983; Golden, 1998; Yackee, 2019), researchers focused 
their attention only recently on why and how European Union (EU) regulatory agencies 
interact with interest groups (Arras and Braun, 2018; Pérez Durán, 2018; Beyers and Arras, 
2019). This article builds on this trend by showing the other side of the coin. Rather than 
focussing on the agency’s perspective, it explains why interest groups themselves are 
interested in engaging with EU agencies. This article therefore asks:   
 
What motivates interest groups to engage with EU agencies? 
 
This study adds to the debate on interest group behaviour and regulatory politics. 
Interest groups seek active engagement with EU agencies (Pérez Durán, 2018; Beyers and 
Arras, 2019). EU agencies are also interested in engaging with interest groups to cultivate 
information, capacity and reputation (Arras and Braun, 2018). It is, however, not yet 
empirically shown what interest groups gain in this context. The broader literature on interest 
groups has indicated that factors such as having influence (Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 
2008; Baroni et al., 2014) and ensuring survival (Lowery, 2007) shape interest group 
behaviour, but has not yet shown whether and how these factors motivate them to engage 
with EU agencies in particular. Research on US agencies has provided factors that account 
for when interest groups lobby regulatory agencies such as the scope of issues, partisan 
affiliation, lobbyist experience and income and representing business interests (McKay, 
2011; Boehmke, Gailmard and Patty, 2013). While these specific factors explain interest 
groups’ engagement patterns, underlying mechanisms and motivators remain implicit. 
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These shortcomings are addressed by qualitatively investigating why interest groups 
engage with an EU agency, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), using 18 interviews 
with high level interest group representatives. Much research on interest groups is 
quantitative and uses observational data (Beyers et al., 2014) and is hence mostly deductive. 
By using an alternative approach, this study offers two contributions.  
Firstly, using an inductive approach to data collection and analysis, previously 
unobserved factors were discovered. EU agencies offer a unique context for this endeavour. 
A major difference with (national) regulatory agencies is the Meroni doctrine, dictating that 
EU agencies may not make normative policy decisions (Barbieri and Ongaro, 2008). 
Furthermore, many EU agencies rely on national regulators for expertise and implementation 
(Groenleer, Kaeding and Versluis, 2010; Heims, 2016). These two attributes limit EU 
agencies’ authority and therefore the appeal for interest groups to influence their conduct. EU 
agencies are, however, gaining direct enforcement powers (Scholten and Scholten, 2017; 
Migliorati, 2020), develop binding guidelines for implementation (Chiti, 2013) and advise the 
European Commission on regulatory changes. Therefore, it is not unlikely that interest 
groups want to influence EU agencies. Capture theory even implies that regulators generally 
have a large potential to be influenced by actors they regulate (Dal Bó, 2006). It remains 
unclear, however, how interest groups navigate the unique characteristics of EU agencies, 
whether and how broad interest group motivators such as having influence (Beyers, Eising 
and Maloney, 2008; Baroni et al., 2014) and ensuring survival (Lowery, 2007) take shape 
given these limitations and whether other explanations are also relevant. This study employs 
the planned behaviour framework (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen and Albarracín, 2007), 
which is unrelated to but compatible with interest group literature, to guide the data collection 
and analysis. This makes the results less guided by existing theoretical assumptions, limiting 
4 
 
the bias towards confirming existing explanations while allowing their validity to be 
evaluated. 
The analysis finds that interest groups are not only driven by previously established 
factors, but also to enhance the reputation of the agency they interact with. Reputation theory 
has been increasingly employed to explain (EU) agency decision-making, showing that they 
are guided by the need to maintain a unique reputation (Busuioc and Rimkutė, 2020). The 
literature has, however, neglected to consider the effects of bureaucratic reputation 
management for interest group behaviour. The inductive approach allowed these effects to be 
uncovered and put into theoretical perspective.  
As a second contribution, the qualitative approach allows implicit mechanisms behind 
explanatory factors, such as representing business interests (McKay, 2011; Boehmke, 
Gailmard and Patty, 2013), to be empirically observed. This paper shows not only that 
business interests interact with regulators, but also why; for example to monitor regulatory 
developments that impact their products.  
This study has practical relevance as interest groups’ behaviour towards EU agencies 
has normative implications. Agencies are increasingly expected to engage with stakeholders 
(Smismans, 2008), and EU agencies are found to appreciate interaction with interest groups 
(Arras and Braun, 2018). Academic and public suspicion is raised, however, whether bad 
intentions of (business) interest groups may harm the safety of regulated products (Dal Bó, 
2006). Knowing interest groups’ perspective and motivation to be involved with EU agencies 
is essential to determine how and to what extent EU agencies can safely benefit from them.  
Why do interest groups do what they do?  
As this research is inductive, theory was not its analytical starting point. Several theories are, 
however, instrumental in explaining why interest groups engage in their activities. To aid the 
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discussion of the inductive results, a literature review on interest group behaviour is given 
below. It provides the theoretical concepts needed to put the findings into perspective. Note 
that these theories did not inform the data collection or analysis.  
Survival, members, influence and access  
The most fundamental theory on interest group conduct proposes that they are above 
all motivated by their survival (Lowery, 2007). Interest groups must secure certain resources 
to survive, as argued by resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Examples 
of these resources are access to policymakers, financial contributions and membership. 
Context specific explanations are however needed to determine what resources ensure 
survival in a particular case. For instance, groups with declining membership may lobby 
salient policies that increase their visibility to potential members.  
Other theories on interest group behaviour focus more concretely on specific 
resources. Some focus on membership. Collective action theory implies that an interest 
organisation can only exists if it pursues the common interests of its members (Olson, 1971; 
Pecorino, 2015). Furthermore, it is important to ensure that membership pays off to avoid 
free riding. Interest groups may forgo benefits that would also help non-members and instead 
offer incentives that are exclusive to members (Olson, 1971), such as briefing them on 
upcoming changes to regulation and helping members comply, rather than decreasing the 
regulatory burden for the entire market.   
Perhaps the most researched interest group resource is influence (Lowery, 2013), 
defined as when A induces, forces or compels B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do (Dahl, 1957). Many contributions take the notion that interest groups want to have 
influence as a given (Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 2008). Another literature shows the 
importance of opportunity structures which are defined as ‘the set of characteristics of a 
given institution that determines the relative ability of (outside) groups to influence decision-
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making within that institution’ (Princen and Kerremans, 2008, p. 1130). This approach also 
implies that interest groups pursue influence. Whether a group is successful, depends on 
characteristics of the institution it lobbies.  
Furthermore, the resource exchange model (Bouwen, 2002, 2004), is based on the 
assumption that interest groups want to have access to policymakers. Interest groups supply 
scarce resources, such as expert information (Flöthe, 2019), in order to gain access. Interest 
group access can be defined as a group entering an arena, passing a threshold controlled by 
relevant gatekeepers (Binderkrantz, Pedersen and Beyers, 2017). Although access is a critical 
step towards influence (Bouwen, 2004), access may also be pursued for different reasons, 
such as gaining legitimacy.  
EU agency reputation as a resource for interest groups 
Following its inductive analysis, this paper finds another resource that interest groups pursue; 
the positive reputation of a regulatory agency. The theoretical foundations of the argument 
are discussed here. 
Bureaucratic reputation is a set of beliefs about an organisation’s capacity, intentions, history 
and mission that are held by relevant audiences (Carpenter and Krause, 2012). As reputation 
is key to an agency’s autonomy and power, agencies avoid and contain threats to their 
reputation (Carpenter, 2010). Studies concluded that reputation is important for EU agencies, 
likely due to the regulatory framework they operate in. EU agencies have different levels of 
competence (Busuioc, 2010). Some decide on the market authorization of products, similar to 
EU member state and US federal agencies. Other EU agencies, however, only assess the risks 
of regulated products. The European Commission then determines whether the risk is 
acceptable and whether, for instance, safety risks weigh up against economic risks of banning 
a product (Roederer-Rynning and Daugbjerg, 2010). Bureaucratic reputation is key in this 
distribution of tasks. With a bad reputation, EU agencies’ assessments of the industry’s 
7 
 
products may not be adopted by the European Commission. Studies have observed that EU 
agencies respond to these reputational threats, for instance by being increasingly transparent 
in their decision-making (Chiti, 2013) and by emphasizing their technical ability and 
independence in communication (Busuioc and Rimkutė, 2020). Furthermore, studies found 
that EU agencies actively use interest groups to enhance their reputation (Arras and Braun, 
2018). However, too much interest group input, especially from regulated actors, is argued to 
lead to regulatory capture (Dal Bó, 2006; Beyers and Arras, 2019) and may in turn diminish 
any reputation of expertise and independence (Rimkutė, 2015). Authors observed that EU 
agencies have adopted strategies to deal with this dynamic (Ossege, 2015), but have failed to 
consider what its impact is on the interest groups themselves. 
The results show that interest groups are aware of EFSA’s reputational requirements 
and are motivated to maintain the agency’s reputation. For business interest groups, EFSA’s 
strong reputation is an important resource. It increases the agency’s authority and helps 
business groups foresee whether EFSA’s product assessments will be adopted or overruled 
by the European Commission, increasing the interest groups’ ability to inform members 
about regulatory changes. But reputation could also be used differently by interest groups. It 
is possible that groups use the deteriorated reputation of an agency to undermine its output. 
For instance, a citizen group might undermine the validity of output it opposes by alerting the 
European Commission to reputational threats an agency faces from having conflicts of 
interest with the industry.  
Research design, operationalisation and data 
This study has an inductive, qualitative design. Given the particular characteristics of 
EU agencies discussed in the introduction, it is appropriate to adopt an inductive approach as 
they present new research puzzles (Toshkov, 2016). Inductive analysis furthermore largely 
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prevents a bias towards confirming existing explanations, in particular because data are 
collected through interviews and are therefore obtrusive.  
The study focusses on EFSA, a typical case of an EU agency that assesses the risks of 
products in preparation for European Commission product approval and advises the European 
Commission on broader regulatory changes (Chamon, 2016). Furthermore, EFSA revised its 
approach to interest group engagement around the time of the interviews and invited 
additional interest groups to be involved (EFSA, 2016). Respondents were therefore likely 
thinking of whether and why the agency would be interesting for them to interact with, 
increasing the accessibility of the data.  
The data consist of 18 semi-structured interviews with high level representatives of 
interest groups held between 12-04-2017 and 07-06-2017. Interviews provide access to 
informal processes of interest groups (Beyers et al., 2014), such as motivation, which are not 
possible to assess using observational data. A drawback of relying on self-reported data is, 
however, that respondents’ answers can be strategic. Interest groups may present themselves 
in a more favourable light than is appropriate. Results are, therefore, only presented if a 
substantial number of respondents agreed. Furthermore, when respondents presented 
conflicting information, it is presented as such. Lastly, neutral language was used during 
interviewsi, which is found to decrease strategic responses from interest groups (Beyers et al., 
2014). A pilot interview helped establish neutral wording. Many studies use observational 
(document) data to triangulate the interview data are improve validity. Available 
observational data, however, reported on behaviour and not on motivation and intention. 
Motivation therefore had to be assessed from interest groups’ own interview responses. 
However, this subjectivity bias should not be overstated as respondents are argued to feel 
pressured to speak truthfully or at least express uncertainly as they may feel examined in an 
academic interview (Beyers et al., 2014). 
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To select interview respondents, a sampling frame was used (Beyers et al., 2014) 
based on a list of registered EFSA stakeholders (EFSA, 2017), established by EFSA as part 
of its stakeholder strategy (EFSA, 2016). All actors on the list fit a behavioural definition of 
interest groups, namely: groups that engage in observable policy related activities (Baroni et 
al., 2014). Interest groups working on EU food regulation can apply for registered 
stakeholder status. This grants them institutionalized access, primarily through an annual 
stakeholder forum and its self-appointed stakeholder bureau. Other important venues for 
interest groups are EFSA’s public consultations, roundtables, hearings and discussion groups. 
These vary in accessibility, with public consultations being the most broadly accessible. 
Interest groups with registered stakeholder status interact most frequently with EFSA, 
making them ideal to probe what motivates them to engage with EU agencies. Most of these 
interest groups are active on a European level. EFSA’s stakeholder list does not contain 
firms, which are rather powerful in EU policymaking (Coen, 1998), but contains mostly 
larger organised interests as these are the focus for EFSA’s stakeholder strategy (EFSA, 
2016). Furthermore, the list does not contain those for which food safety regulation is an 
irregular concern. These groups may therefore be motivated by other factors then those found 
here. The appendix includes a comparison between the interest group type distribution of 
registered stakeholders and of EFSA’s consultation commenters. The largest biases compared 
to EFSA’s consultations are an overrepresentation of business and a lack of public authorities 
as registered stakeholders.  
Interest groups were randomly selected from EFSA’s stakeholder list. Stratification 
ensured that the sample reflects the population in terms of group type distribution. The 
INTEREURO codebook (Berkhout et al., 2015) was used to code group types. Of the 95 
interest groups in the population, 47 were approached of which 18 gave an interview (19% 
sample, 38% response rate). The reasons potential respondents gave for declining an 
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interview, provide insights in the selection biases. Some indicated that their interaction with 
EFSA is limited and others refused due to the sensitive nature of the topic, implying that this 
research is limited in explaining a lack of interest group motivation and motivation in salient 
topics. The respondents represent 10 business associations (BA), 4 citizen groups (CG), 3 
professional associations (PA) and 1 research institute (RI). This sample allows for showing 
some differences between business associations and citizen groups, in particular because the 
within-group narrative overlaps. Specific findings for professional associations and research 
institutes could, however, not be inferred from the data. In the Appendix, an interview 
methods table provides an anonymised overview of the approached and interviewed interest 
groups, as proposed by Bleich & Pekkanen (2015).  
To operationalise the central concept of this study, motivation, sensitising concepts 
(Bowen, 2006) were used. These broad categories help make sense of the data while allowing 
results to emerge independently from existing theories. To that aim, an empirical approach 
from a different literature was used; the planned behaviour framework (Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1977; Ajzen, 2001). Along the lines of this framework, motivation is defined as the 
propensity of an actor to engage in a certain kind of behaviour. The planned behaviour 
framework provides a way of structurally assessing this phenomenon. It has proven useful in 
different empirical contexts. In particular, it is suitable for reasoned decision-making, such as 
the decision of politicians to use strategic plans (Desmidt and Meyfroodt, 2020) and public 
managers’ use of performance information (Kroll, 2015). Note that reasoned does not mean 
rational as reasons to engage in an activity may be subjective (Ajzen, 2011) and the 
framework focuses on perceived rather than objective factors. Adopting the planned 
behaviour approach in explaining interest group’s motivation is suitable as it is often 
understood as a reasoned strategy decision, with some highlighting interest groups’ 
experimental and less calculated strategy considerations (Pralle, 2003). The planned 
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behaviour approach allows for these subjective factors to be included. Planned behaviour 
consists of three constructs; attitude, subjective norm and behavioural control. Attitude relies 
on the expectancy-value model (Ajzen, 2001) and implies that an actor is motivated to take a 
course of action when the consequences of a course of action are valued positively by the 
actor. This model fits existing explanations from interest group literature well, as it 
recognizes several consequences interest groups pursue and value, such as access and 
influence. In the operationalisation, interest groups are motived to engage with EFSA if the 
consequences of their engagement are positively valued by the interest group.  
Subjective norm concerns what others think of a course of action and whether an 
actor values their opinion. When other’s concerns are valued by the actor, it acts accordingly. 
This factor is applicable in an interest group context as interest groups are often argued to act 
in accordance with other actors’ expectations such as their constituency and the public at 
large (Flöthe and Rasmussen, 2018), but also allied interest groups (Halpin, 2011). In the 
context of this research, subjective norm reflects expectations interest groups’ outside actors 
have concerning their engagement with EFSA and whether interest groups comply with these 
expectations.  
The final construct, behavioural control, concerns whether the actor has the ability to 
engage in a course of action. It consists of two parts; the capacity and the autonomy of an 
actor to do something (Yzer, 2012). Interest group research has used comparable concepts to 
explain interest group behaviour such as resources (Halpin, Fraussen and Nownes, 2017), 
comparable to capacity, and access (Binderkrantz, Pedersen and Beyers, 2017), where 
behaviour is not autonomous but subject to a gatekeeper’s approval. In this research, 
behavioural control reflects the ability of an interest group to engage with EFSA, both in 
terms of its own capacity to do so and whether an interest groups can make the autonomous 
decision to engage with the agency. The latter is related to but different from subjective norm 
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as subjective norm concerns the desire of an outside actor and whether that affects the 
motivation of a group to act. Behavioural control concerns the ability of a group to act. That 
ability may nonetheless be determined by an outside actor.  
The broad planned behaviour framework thus allows many interest group literature 
concepts to be observed while allowing for undiscovered explanations of interest group 
behaviour to be included (see Table 1 for an overview).  
[Table 1 near here] 
Based on the planned behaviour approach, a topic list was made to guide the 
interviews and a coding scheme to analyse the data (see Appendix). The coding procedure 
started with the three constructs from the operationalisation and resulted in seven themes that 
were inductively found (see Table 2 and Appendix for full procedure). 
Research using qualitative methods has received criticism for not giving transparent 
accounts of how research is conducted (Isaac, 2015). Especially qualitative data analysis 
remains difficult to report transparently. This article provides a new way of reporting 
qualitative analysis; empirical coverage. It combines the coverage statistic provided in NVivo 
qualitative coding software and the word counts of the transcripts to establish the percentage 
of the transcripts’ word count that informed the results (see Table 2). Additionally, a 
percentage is given for each interview, indicating what proportion of the transcript is reported 
on in the results (see Appendix). This way, both the themes and the interviews can be 
evaluated on whether they reflect each other.  
Results and discussion 
[Table 2 near here]  
The analysis resulted in seven inductively found subthemes for the three 
operationalised constructs. Most themes were discussed by a high number of respondents (see 
Table 2). Coverage statistics indicates the importance of topics for respondents. Most of the 
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data covers attitude, followed by behavioural control and subjective norm. Most subthemes 
were discussed in 5 to 7 per cent of the data, except the receptiveness of the agency, which is 
discussed much more. Below, a description is given for each (sub)theme, supported by quotes 
from the interviews. Frequency counts are provided in the text to show what proportion of all 
respondents, or those of a certain group type, support a claim. As subthemes were not 
predetermined, respondents were not asked about all claims in the results. When respondents 
do not actively support a claim, this therefore does not mean that they oppose it. Furthermore, 
these inductively found results are discussed using existing theoretical accounts of interest 
group behaviour (see Table 2 for an overview). 
Attitude 
The attitude theme reflects what the positively valued consequences are of interacting 
with EFSA for interest groups. Taking the concept attitude as starting point, three such 
consequences were inductively found in the data; increasing predictability, enhancing 
reputation and improving risk assessment. 
Increasing predictability passively 
When interest groups interact with EFSA, they gain information to be better prepared, 
both for regulatory changes and for their future interaction with the agency. EFSA’s risk 
assessments are particularly important for interest groups in this regard. The agency assesses 
the risks of food or feed substances, health claims and pesticide residues in food. EFSA bases 
its assessment on the dossiers of studies companies submit to apply for a market authorisation 
and on existing research. With EFSA’s assessment, the European Commission decides 
whether the substance may be sold on the internal market. This decision is not only important 
for the company that applies for a market authorisation, but also for those that use the 
substance in their own products. Business associations (7/10) want to ensure that this 
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regulatory system works in a predictable way and that they are not faced with surprises that 
negatively affect their members. A business association indicated that they observe what 
EFSA is doing in their risk assessments and inform their members about possible future 
regulatory restrictions;  
‘So as part of our work we do a general monitoring of any regulatory developments 
that might be of interest. So, we, almost on a weekly basis, we check EFSA’s output for 
anything that might be of interest for our sector. Obviously not all of this is.’ (BA9) 
When EFSA gives a positive or negative assessment, the European Commission 
usually decides accordingly: 
‘And it is extremely difficult for the risk managers [European Commission or, in some 
contexts, national regulators] to depart from an EFSA opinion. When EFSA delivers a 
recommendation, then, that is the reality, the legal services of the Commission forces their 
services to follow the EFSA opinion. Or if they depart from it, to justify it. So, you see that 
way that EFSA, the panel, are much more powerful than we believe.’ (BA4) 
The agency has considerable informal regulatory power, making it interesting for 
interest groups to know what EFSA will decide in its risk assessment in order to foresee 
regulatory restrictions by the European Commission.  
Additionally, when interest groups (8/18) engage with EFSA, they improve their 
abilities for future engagement. As one business association indicated about the requirements 
of EFSA for submitting a risk assessment request:  
‘It is not that we say; we don’t want to do extra studies. But it is just important to 




Some citizen groups (2/4) and a professional association (1/3) are also motivated to 
learn from interacting with EFSA. A citizen group indicated that they learn many new things 
through interacting with EFSA; 
‘And you, and to understand better what is going on. What the opportunities are with 
this change and what we need to ask from them. It was interesting. We had a very instructive 
meeting. So, we could test some things basically.’  (CG4)  
In their engagement with EFSA, interest groups learn more about its tactics and 
prepare future engagements with EFSA and the European Commission, indirectly leading to 
more influence. These interest groups’ efforts towards EFSA are rather passive as they 
mostly consist of observing what EFSA does when interacting with the agency.  
Survival & membership 
Given these findings, the question remains how they fit existing explanations for 
interest group behaviour. The observations fit well within the framework that assumes 
interest organisations cultivate critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) to secure their 
own survival (Lowery, 2007). In this case, they increase their ability to advocate by learning 
from their engagement with EFSA, as previously found by Kaya (2019) in a different 
context. Keeping updated on EFSA's risk assessments to inform business association 
members of future regulatory decisions, fits the notion of offering services that are exclusive 
to members. Informing members of upcoming regulation increases the appeal of business 
associations for (potential) members and overcomes free riding problems (Olson, 1971) as 
non-members will not be informed.  
Increasing predictability actively 
Returning to the results, respondents also indicated a more active way of increasing 
predictability. They aim to change the approach the agency has towards them. Many business 
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associations (5/10) indicate that there is very limited interaction between a company and 
EFSA when its products are assessed. They indicate that EFSA behaves unpredictably, for 
instance by misunderstanding the dossier they submit for EFSA’s risk assessment and 
delaying the procedure. By allowing companies to further explain complicated dossiers 
during risk assessment, business associations claim that the process can be made less 
complex and more predictable. A respondent indicated;  
‘If you understand the scientific thinking of the other party, it is easier to accept it. 
But then it goes off to EFSA. And there is no dialogue in EFSA. They don’t see the full picture 
behind the argumentation that is being made.’ (BA2)  
An often-mentioned (4/18) preference of business associations is to have pre-
submission meetings during which a company discusses its risk assessment dossier with 
EFSA before it is submitted. During such a meeting, EFSA could show where the dossier 
needs further clarification or additional studies. Respondents indicated that they ask EFSA to 
implement such meetings in their interaction with the agency, but EFSA is hesitant to do so. 
Some interest groups (2/18) also spoke out against EFSA having such meetings during 
interviews, indicating that it would unduly affect the outcome of the assessment. 
Influence & access 
Again, these findings fit existing theoretical frameworks well. The aim to increase 
predictability by increasing the interaction with EFSA is in line with the theoretical 
assumption that interest groups pursue both influence (Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 2008) 
and access (Binderkrantz, Pedersen and Beyers, 2017). In this case, some business 
associations want to change the agency’s conduct (influence) by asking the agency to allow 
for more interaction (access) with companies during the risk assessment process. 
Respondents disagreed on whether such access in turn leads to further influence. Business 
associations claim that providing businesses access to risk assessments makes the process 
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more predictable, with fewer delays and information requests. A citizen group and a 
professional association claim that industry would aim to affect the outcome of the 
assessment when provided access to it.  
Enhancing reputation of the agency 
Interest groups (10/18) are motivated to enhance and maintain the reputation of EFSA 
as a scientific authority. Regarding EFSA’s reputation, a business association indicated that;  
‘It is in everybody’s interest that they [EFSA] can preserve their integrity and 
neutrality. So that whatever they then produce as an opinion has a value.’ (BA8)  
And citizen groups agree:  
‘What our members want and what we want is to make sure that EFSA remains a 
reputable agency. So that we can trust their opinions. We know that if they deem that 
something is safe that we are sure of this. We are sure that if they approve a claim on a 
product, we can be confident that consumers pay for something that lives up to the 
expectations to what the claim says.’ (CG1) 
If EFSA’s reputation would deteriorate, business associations (4/10) fear that the 
regulatory system will become based on interests rather than science. An interest group stated 
to want to avoid a situation where EFSA’s decision making becomes politicized (BA10) as a 
result of threats to their reputation. Another business association indicated:  
‘Because for us it is of course very important that we focus on science-based 
decisions and legislation. And that is for us also certainly very difficult because food is 
something emotional and that we, the only thing that we can do is to rely on science. And 
otherwise it is going to get out of control, and everybody will say and decide anything, like 
restrictions or whatever. So, concerning that for us as well, EFSA is very important as 
European authority.’ (BA5) 
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On the other hand, citizen groups often (3/4) indicate that, despite business’s seeming 
concerns, business associations want to influence EFSA beyond a scientific level. They 
indicate that: 
‘Industry is very interested in setting the science to its hand.’ (CG4) 
In order to prevent this, they address EFSA’s conflicts of interest to the agency and 
the general public and call for a better balance in interest representation: 
‘I think EFSA should be more independent. I think EFSA in their process should have 
more the voice of consumers during the risk assessment. There is too much information from 
the industry. Too many conflicts of interest. And I think they can improve that. So, I believe 
that being, say, a stakeholder we can try to achieve this.’ (CG3) 
Business associations (3/10) in turn indicate that the criticism that citizen groups 
have, is detrimental for EFSA’s reputation as it puts the agency in a bad light. Paradoxically, 
the efforts of citizen groups to enhance EFSA’s reputation may also be detrimental to it. A 
citizen group indicated that the agency (unfairly) accuses them of harming their reputation:  
‘We are not here to undermine EFSA we are just pointing out where we see problems. 
And it is not, by saying it we have a bad intention or a mean hidden agenda with them. But 
they take that very badly. Instead of looking if they can improve, they go; “it is your fault, it 
is your fault we have a bad name”. You know. And honestly I don’t think it is an appropriate 
response.’ (CG4)  
Furthermore, the concerns from citizen groups put business representatives in a 
paradoxical situation. They want to maintain EFSA’s reputation and avoid unpredictability, 
but that requires that they not interfere with the agency’s work as this will lead to criticism 
from citizen groups. Business associations (4/10) thus claim to only address scientific 
inaccuracies and refrain from publicly criticising EFSA or unduly influencing the agency. 
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The latter would damage EFSA’s reputation and hence the predictability of the regulatory 
process. One interest group indicates:  
‘If, let’s assume that we were there, going through the back door and whispering in 
their ears, making them write a report that would be very much matching our agenda. Then 
later if that was revealed, then of course the opinion [of EFSA] would have no value. So, 
there would be a sort of, undermining your own efforts in doing that.’ (BA8) 
Business associations are thus aware of the negative effects if they are too involved 
with EFSA. They must balance their concern for EFSA’s reputation with their desire to 
increase their interaction during the risk assessments as indicated in the previous section. 
According to business associations, they often refrain from interacting with EFSA, or at least 
refrain from using unofficial channels or lobbying on a non-scientific basis. This is heavily 
contested by citizen groups which addressed their doubts about EFSA’s independence from 
industry during the interviews.  
Reputation theory 
Turning to the theoretical embedding of these findings, interest groups’ concerns with 
the reputation of their venue have not yet featured in interest group literature as something 
that motivates interest groupsii. This finding is puzzling as some even indicate that a strong 
reputation can shield an agency from interest group influence (Carpenter, 2010), which 
interest groups presumably want to avoid. Interest groups argue that they aim to maintain the 
reputation of EFSA as a scientific authority, similar to the finding that EU agencies 
themselves care about their reputation for technical and scientific expertise (Rimkutė, 2015; 
Busuioc and Rimkutė, 2020). A reputation is embedded in a network of multiple audiences 
(Carpenter and Krause, 2012). The main audience relevant to EFSA’s reputation is, according 
to the data, the European Commission and EU consumers (groups) who are concerned with 
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food safety. When the agency has a good reputation, interest groups know that they can rely 
on EFSA’s judgement to be respected by these audiences, in line with the theoretical 
assumption that reputation is instrumental to an agency’s authority (Carpenter, 2010; 
Carpenter and Krause, 2012). Interest groups adjust their behaviour accordingly. Business 
associations’ approach to the agency should not be suspicious as that causes the agency to 
lose its reputation and can no longer be counted upon to produce consequential risk 
assessments. Citizen groups encourage EFSA to behave more reputably by speaking out 
when they believe its reputation is compromised. But these actions are in itself reputational 
treats to the agency and may diminish the authority of EFSA in the eyes of the European 
Commission. This shows that the reputation of agencies, as a driver of interest group 
behaviour, can lead to paradoxical outcomes.  
Improving risk assessment 
The last subtheme of attitude is improving risk assessment. Through their interaction 
with EFSA, interest groups (14/18) indicate that they improve the risk assessment capabilities 
of the agency. They do this in two ways; by providing evidence and by improving the 
methodology. Interest groups provide feedback to show what they, or their members, want. 
Apart from data that supports their own interests, they also indicate that they give information 
without a particular agenda (10/18). Concerning an evaluation on the impact of pesticides on 
bees, a business group indicated; 
‘There is lots of data that can be looked at and that actually tell you a lot more. And 
that could help to reduce the complexity of the whole bee evaluation that is being proposed. 
So, it is really trying to provide science, scientific argumentation and scientific dialogue, that 
is what we have been trying to offer during this whole process.’ (BA2).  
Business associations (5/10) also indicate how products are used in order to provide a 
more realistic view of the risk those products pose. Additionally, interest groups (11/18) 
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claim to improve the methodology for risk assessment. This is highly relevant to them as a 
citizen group representative indicates;  
‘So again, why do people engage with EFSA? That is because the devil is in the 
detail. And something can be dangerous or not dangerous at all, just depending on the 
glasses that you look with. So, if you have a methodology that allows you to reveal problems, 
then you will see problems. If you have a methodology that does not allow you to reveal 
problems, then you will not see them. And that does not mean that the problems are not 
there.’ (CG2)  
EFSA’s methods determine the outcomes of their risk assessment. Hence, citizen 
groups (3/4) are interested in making methods more able in spotting problems and risks of 
products. On the other hand, business associations (3/10) indicate that they want methods to 
be more comprehensible for their members.  
‘On the fact that EFSA, in their methodology, [x]iii panel, its methodology, is 
relatively old-fashioned. And does not properly take into account [x], to meet the minimum 
requirement for [x]. That is a bit of an old-fashioned way of seeing nutrition. That is not the 
modern way of thinking. So that is in that sense where we see frustration.’ (BA4) 
Influence & access 
These results concerning changing EFSA’s methodology, can be explained by the 
assumption in the literature that interest groups aim to influence (regulatory) policy (Beyers, 
Eising and Maloney, 2008; Lowery, 2013) as interest groups attempt to make EFSA do 
something it is currently not doing. Although, the finding that some interest groups supply 
data to EFSA without the aim to influence policy fits the assumption that interest groups want 
access to policymakers (Binderkrantz, Pedersen and Beyers, 2017) and supply resources to 
that effect (Bouwen, 2004). It is questionable, however, whether the information provided 
merely serves to gain access or also to influence the agency by providing them with 
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suggestive or one-sided information. Supplying scientific data and studies may therefore also 
be an attempt at influence, but the interview data does not allow to infer this.   
Subjective norm 
In the operationalisation used, motivation is shaped by the preference of outside 
actors of interest groups to engage with EFSA and whether interest groups comply with 
these; subjective norm. Only one such outside actor was inductively found during the 
interviewsiv; the interest group’s member base.  
Member base 
Members are highly important for interest groups. As most organisations in the 
sample are on a European level (16/18), members are often (13/18) national interest groups 
with members of their own. Some have individual members (10/18), typically firms or 
professionals. Interest groups in the sample (15/18) see the common interests of their 
members as their most important input. A business association indicated;  
  ‘That is the starting point for me. What [the member base] thinks. And when it then 
happens that the EFSA assessment is in line with that, we are more than happy to use it.’ 
(BA1) 
This is more difficult for some than for others. Most business associations (6/10) 
represent a combination of national associations, sectorial associations and individual 
companies. They must combine their interests and develop expertise in many areas. Other 
interest groups serve a more coherent member base or even no member base at all (1/18). 
Disagreement between members may result in the interest group taking a more nuanced 
position. Business associations (4/10) indicate that they do not interfere in the competition 
between their members:  
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‘And if we would help company A, but we do not help company B and company C 
does not at all know what to do, then we enter a competitive field. And that may not happen. 
And that we never do.’ (BA10) 
Collective action & membership 
The results on interest groups’ motivation to serve their members is in line with 
expectations from collective action theory (Olson, 1971; Pecorino, 2015). Most tellingly, 
competition between members is not a collective good and hence interest group refrain from 
interfering. This is in line with the perspective that interest organisations exist to pursue 
collective goods rather than serve the individual interests of members (Olson, 1971). 
Behavioural control 
The final aspect of the motivation is the extent to which interest groups feel they have 
the capacity and autonomy to engage with EFSA: their behavioural control. Two subthemes 
were inductively found. The interest groups point out that their motivation to engage with 
EFSA is determined by their capacity in terms of scientific expertise, and by the 
receptiveness of the agency. 
Capacity 
A substantial amount of interest groups (11/18) indicate that they have limited staff 
and resources and therefore carefully set their priorities when it comes to engaging with 
EFSA: 
‘So, there is always a question of making a business case and whether that would be a 
good use of resources. Because someone needs an accommodation, to travel there, also the 
time that they will be taking off will run.’ (BA9)  
Citizen groups (2/4) expressed that their capacity is in general outweighed by the 
capacity of business associations. The latter can therefore arguably more easily specialise on 
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the many different subjects EFSA deals with and are more capable of engaging with the 
agency. Many respondents (14/18) point to a specific type of capacity; scientific expertise. 
When interest groups have scientific expertise, in particular on toxicology and biology, they 
are more capable of engaging with the agency. When they do not have scientific expertise, 
they are often barred from interacting with EFSA. One business association indicated about 
cases in which EFSA asks them to provide data: 
‘In practice 95% of the data which are generated by our members, by the company 
let’s say, do not meet the quality criteria of EFSA. So, they are ignored. Which means that we 
usually do not spend too much time in asking our members to provide data because they 
know that they are not taken into account by EFSA if they don’t meet the minimum quality 
criteria.’ (BA4) 
And a citizen group expressed:  
‘You go there with a very scientific, sound proposal. “This is how the methodology 
should look like, because of this, this and this.” You never go to EFSA with bold assessments. 
Because they are scientific technical people and they need data.’ (CG2) 
Few interest groups (2/18) indicate that their knowledge falls short of what EFSA 
requires. Companies, for instance, generate knowledge for in house purposes. But EFSA 
usually demands higher standards and ignores the data they provide. Additionally, some 
citizen groups and business associations (3/14) indicate that they have no scientific capacity, 
which prevents them from engaging with EFSA. 
Scientific expertise 
In line with many contributions in the literature, the results indicate that resources 
explain interest group motivation. Specifically, the lack of scientific knowledge demotivates 
interest groups to engage with EFSA as their input will likely be ignored. The concept 
expertise found in the literature (Gormley, 1986; Bouwen, 2002), is a similar but broader 
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resource than scientific knowledge. Expertise can be both about natural scientific facts as 
well as the feasibly and economic impact of regulation (De Bruycker, 2016; Flöthe, 2019). 
The respondents indicate that EFSA favours the former. Furthermore, the effect of expertise 
is often seen as a marginal, linear contribution to the ability of interest groups to achieve their 
goals. While the results do not contradict this and respondents do indeed talk in terms of 
more and less expertise, the results do indicate that interest groups see scientific expertise 
mainly as a necessity for them to interact with EFSA. In other words, respondents discussed 
expertise as a dummy rather than a continuous variable, implying that is not how much but 
whether an interest group has scientific expertise that matters most for their motivation. This 
is not to say, however, that more expertise may not lead to more interest group success in the 
EU agency context.  
Receptiveness of the agency 
The final subtheme is the receptiveness of the agency towards interest groups. This is 
related to their autonomy to engage with EFSA; the more receptive the agency is, the more an 
interest groups can determine autonomously whether they engage with it. The interest groups 
disagree on whether the agency is too closed or open enough. Those that indicate that the 
agency is too closed (7/18), blame this on the criticism the agency receives for having 
conflicts of interest and not being independent enough: 
‘The problem is that in general EFSA, I suspect out of fear for more far reaching 
claims that they are too close to the industry, are often particularly distant, even completely 
distant on the level of the evaluation of scientific studies. To avoid every suspicion of conflict 
of interest, they rather not speak to the applicant or the owner of the [risk assessment] 
dossier.’ (BA3) 
However, the receptiveness of EFSA is not consistent. On some tasks, such as 
establishing broad rules on methodology and implementation of regulation, interest groups 
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indicate that EFSA is much more welcoming towards them compared to specific risk 
assessments.  
‘This kind of business, when stakeholder participation is considered, so compiling 
guidance documents [documents that guide the implementation process], the public 
consultation issues, I think that we should be really happy as an industry with how this goes.’ 
(BA3).  
Primarily business associations (4/10) indicate that they are invited to provide input 
on these broad issues. A business association further indicated that these broader issues are 
more political and interest driven than the more scientific risk assessments, allowing interest 
groups to represent a political interest.  
Furthermore, citizen groups (2/4) claim that the fact that they represent a public 
interest, results in the agency being more receptive towards them. They can shape public 
opinion and are therefore important actors to interact with for the agency. And lastly, EFSA 
is currently setting up a new approach towards interest group engagement. Some interest 
groups (3/18) indicate that this may make EFSA more open and create a better balance of 
interest. A citizen group indicated about this new approach:  
‘we think that they did a lot to meet the expectations from stakeholders when it comes 
to discussions when it comes to transparency, independence and stakeholder involvement.’ 
(CG1).  
But other interest groups (7/18) are hesitant and have yet to see how this new 
approach will turn out.  
Access and venue shopping 
Along the lines of the conceptualisation (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Ajzen and 
Albarracín, 2007), an interest group’s autonomy to engage with EFSA is understood to be 
part of its motivation to do so. The results confirm this as they show that some interest groups 
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find it discouraging that EFSA is too closed towards them. This finding is in line with the 
definition of access, specifically the gatekeeper role of public actors (Binderkrantz, Pedersen 
and Beyers, 2017). It also supports venue shopping theory assumptions (Pralle, 2003; Princen 
and Kerremans, 2008) indicating that interest groups look at the receptiveness of a venue 
when deciding to advocate at certain venue.  
Conclusion  
This research set out to close a gap in interest group literature by explaining why 
interest groups are motivated to engage with EU agencies. Looking closely at interest groups 
interacting with EFSA, this research shows the depth and diversity of what interest groups 
want in this setting and how their motivation is formed. In most cases, the inductive findings 
fit existing theories on interest group behaviour. Interest groups are observed to strive for 
increased predictability, in line with the assumption that interest groups aim for survival, 
membership, influence and access (Olson, 1971; Lowery, 2007, 2013; Binderkrantz, 
Pedersen and Beyers, 2017). Furthermore, their concern for member base preferences is 
accounted for by collective action theory (Olson, 1971; Pecorino, 2015). The findings that 
interest groups’ behaviour is shaped by their scientific expertise, matches resource exchange 
theory (Bouwen, 2002, 2004). That the receptiveness of the agency matters, fits assumptions 
in venue shopping theory (Princen and Kerremans, 2008) and the gatekeeper role of public 
actors in shaping interest group behaviour (Binderkrantz, Pedersen and Beyers, 2017). By 
showing why interest groups engage with EFSA, this research highlights the detailed 
mechanisms behind existing explanations for interest group behaviour. In the case of the 
reputational concerns of interest groups, however, interest group theories fall short. This 
paper proposes to bring in bureaucratic reputation theory to understand why interest groups 
are motivated to, at times, refrain from interacting with regulators. From a normative 
perspective, this is an important finding as EU agencies aim to build a reputation of technical 
28 
 
competence (Busuioc and Rimkutė, 2020). Interest groups may be instrumental in achieving 
this goal as the results show they are inclined to maintain EFSA’s reputation. EU agencies 
themselves also realise that interest groups can be used to enhance their reputation (Arras and 
Braun, 2018).  
Looking more broadly, future research should look into how the reputation of other 
actors than EU agencies affect interest group conduct. Furthermore, reputation theory offers 
other explanations for interest group behaviour. For instance, studies recognise that interest 
groups themselves are also actively maintaining their public image (Chalmers and Shotton, 
2016) which in turn may affect their lobby success. The results found here imply that a 
reputation of scientific competence may be instrumental for interest groups in influencing EU 
agencies. Reputation theory offers tools to investigate the nature of the reputation interest 
groups themselves maintain, what reputational threats interest groups face, and whether 
crucial audiences recognise their desired reputation (Carpenter, 2010).  
The inductive nature of this study limits its generalisability. EU agencies differ in 
their competences and therefore in the extent to which they are interesting for interest groups 
to engage with. Some agencies, like the chemicals agency ECHA and the medicines agency 
EMA, are similar in terms of competences and should therefore have a similar appeal to 
interest groups. Many respondents, however, indicated that EFSA faces more reputational 
threats than other agencies, naming ECHA specifically. Reputational concerns might 
therefore be less important for other agencies. Future research should assess generalisability 
through a deductive study across regulatory agencies. This research, furthermore, has no 
empirical basis to assess whether some interest group motivators are more salient than others. 
Future research should study interest group behaviour to show whether they are willing, for 
example, to forgo influencing regulation to preserve the reputation of a regulator when it 
comes down to it. Researchers should also assess whether interest group conduct objectively 
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contributes to or undermines the reputation of regulatory agencies using observational rather 
than self-reported data. 
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Construct  Explanation of motivation Compatible concepts  
Attitude  Consequences of engaging 
with EFSA are valued 





Other actors want the interest 
group to engage with EFSA 
and it complies with these 
expectations 
Membership, societal 
pressure, interest group 
cooperation 
Behavioural control Interest group has the capacity 
and autonomy to engage with 
EFSA 
Resources, gatekeeper  





























Themes Freq. % total WC Theoretical explanation 
Attitude 18 25.63  
- Increasing predictability 14 6.05 Survival, membership, 
influence & access 
- Enhancing reputation 13 6.83 Reputation 
- Improving risk assessment 14 5.97 Influence, access 
Subjective norm 16 7.11  
- Member base 16 5.12 Membership 
Behavioural control 18 17.01  
- Capacity 18 6.88 Expertise, access 




Total main themes 
 
49.76  
Table 2: Themes with numbers of interviews mentioning them (Frequency) 





i Examples include ‘How capable are you to make your voice heard in European policymaking?’ 
(asked to BA1) instead of ‘How influential are you?’ and using the term ‘stakeholder’ instead of 
‘interest group’ for citizen groups as they are more comfortable with it.  
ii See Arras & Braun (2018) for reputational expectations of EU agencies from their engagement with 
interest groups and Trapp & Laursen (2017) arguing that interest groups maintain a positive public 
image of policymakers through media appearances. 
iii [x] is used instead of information that compromises the respodent’s anonymity.   
iv Interest groups are sometimes invited by EFSA, suggesting that the agency also wants interest 
groups to engage. However, for consistency with similar findings, this is discussed under behavioural 
control.  
